.Chapter 79 Find a different path

As the Minister of War, inquiries about economic affairs, it is obvious that he is out of office. You should know that in the State Council, there are departments specifically responsible for the economy. According to Huang Hanlin's power plan for the Ministry of War, the Ministry of War can only make suggestions on economic issues and cannot interfere indirectly.

Of course, the Ministry of War has its own uniqueness.

The most unique feature is that the Ministry of War is not under the State Council, but an institution parallel to the State Council, and is more like an intermediary between the State Council and the General Staff. Moreover, the Minister of War is indirectly responsible to the head of state and not to the Prime Minister, and is significantly higher in his position than the department of the State Council.

This brings up a new question: What should the Ministry of Defense do?

In fact, the Ministry of War is the strengthened Ministry of Defense, and at the end of the year, when the Ministry of War was officially established, most of the personnel came from the Ministry of Defense.

Judging from the situation at that time, Huang Hanlin established the Ministry of War rather than improving the status of the Ministry of National Defense, mainly to bypass a problem that had existed in China for decades, namely the conflict between the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff. If the Ministry of Defense is indirectly improved the status of the Ministry of Defense, it will definitely weaken the General Staff. During the war, the General Staff was significantly higher than the Ministry of National Defense. As a result, Huang Hanlin could only bypass the Ministry of National Defense and established a brand new department, and let Mu Haoyang, who was already the chief of the General Staff, serve as the Minister of War, so as to integrate the Ministry of National Defense and the General Staff.

It can be said that Huang Hanlin is indeed superior to others in his political skills.

By establishing the War Department, the two command agencies of the affairs forces have completed seamless integration, thus greatly improving the operational efficiency of the army.

More importantly, this avoids meaningless political disputes.

Of course, as the Minister of War, Mu Haoyang's main responsibility is to plan and use military forces.

When there is no big battle to fight, planning military power has become his main job.

Objectively speaking, before the end of 2053, the military environment faced by China was not optimistic and had no strategic advantage. It would take a longer-term view and at the earliest, until the end of 2054, when the effects of the mobilization of the full-scale war began to appear, China could gain the initiative strategically. Even by the end of 2053, China would have to narrow the strategic gap at most.

All of this is related to China's military power construction plan.

Among them, the most important thing is naval construction, because in the confrontation between China and the United States, the navy is the first force, and the air force and the army can only play a role after the navy achieves a decisive victory. Especially for China, the importance of naval construction overwhelms everything.

Don't forget that China and the United States are separated by the Pacific Ocean, which accounts for half of the earth's surface area.

More importantly, China does not have a frontier base close to the United States, but the United States has a large number of forward bases around China.

From a military perspective, the United States only needs to maintain its existing naval advantage to turn its focus to the Air Force and the Army, but China must first gain an advantage in the navy in order to get the opportunity to make the Air Force and the Army play a role, that is, China's military strategic situation is far inferior to that of the United States.

The problem is that the naval construction cycle is much higher than that of the Air Force and the Army.

In a sense, this is the biggest problem facing China and the most prominent strategic flaw.

You should know that it will take two years to build a "Tarzan"-class super aircraft carrier, even if it does not include the imagined time and is fully constructed according to wartime standards. In other words, even if the Chinese Navy begins to increase aircraft carrier orders by the end of 2052, it will not be completed until the end of 2054.

That's why Mu Haoyang believes that the Chinese Navy will not have the opportunity to gain strategic advantages until the end of 2054.

Of course, this is a very optimistic estimate, because the United States will build large warships at the same speed, even faster.

In early December, Mu Haoyang signed the first ministerial order as Minister of War to expand the construction scale of the "Tarzan" class aircraft carrier.

In accordance with the order he signed, the major shipyards will not only start construction of eight "Taishan" class within the year, but also start construction of four new large ships by the end of March 2053, and complete the construction of four new large ships by the end of June 2053, and strive to start construction of four super aircraft carriers by the end of September 2053. The ultimate goal is to increase the number of large ships that can build super aircraft carriers to twenty by the end of 2053 and reach thirty-six by the end of 2054, so as to build super aircraft carriers in large quantities.

There is no doubt that this is a very majestic, but very difficult to achieve.

Not to mention, even if Dalian Shipyard, Qingdao Shipyard, Jiangnan Shipyard and Guangzhou Shipyard can only build up to twenty large ships. If you want to continue to expand the number of super aircraft carriers, you have to open up new shipyards or improve the construction capacity of other shipyards. This is definitely not a one-year or even two-year work. It is conservatively estimated that at least three years will be required.

Obviously, Mu Haoyang's ministerial order seemed to be pulling seedlings to encourage growth.

Judging from the situation at that time, this was also related to the urgent situation. Soon after that, Mu Haoyang realized that the ministerial order he issued was impossible to complete. Even if the shipyard could build enough shipbuilding stations, the supporting industrial equipment could not meet such a huge shipbuilding demand.

As a result, by early 2053, Mu Haoyang revised this order.

According to his re-planning, the main task of the large shipyard is not to expand the scale of shipbuilding, but to shorten the shipboard cycle through improved construction technology. If the shipboard cycle of the super aircraft carrier can be shortened to within one year, even if there are only sixteen large shipboards, it will be enough.

In fact, by the end of the war, China had only sixteen large ships to build super aircraft carriers.

Of course, the Navy is not just an aircraft carrier.

Objectively speaking, if the Chinese Navy focuses on aircraft carriers, it will definitely not be able to surpass the United States by the end of 2054, because the United States has an increasingly large-scale aircraft carrier construction plan, and when the war breaks out, the United States has a stronger aircraft carrier construction strength than China.

According to the intelligence provided by the Military Intelligence Bureau, when the war broke out, the second batch of three "U.S." class aircraft carriers had been launched, and the installation was estimated to be completed in June 2053. The third batch of six "U.S." class and the fourth batch of six "U.S." class will be launched at the beginning of 2053 and at the end of 2053. Subsequently, the United States will build an increasingly large aircraft carrier, and it is likely to start construction in the second half of 2053 and enter service in the second half of 2055. In this way, even if Mu Haoyang issued the Ministerial Order at the end of 2052, it can implement the

Now, by the end of 2054, the US Navy still has 24 aircraft carriers, while the Chinese Navy has only 16 aircraft carriers at most. Even by the end of 2055, the US Navy will have 36 aircraft carriers, of which 12 will be new super aircraft carriers, and the Chinese Navy will have only 32 aircraft carriers at most, and none of them are new super aircraft carriers. The gap in the size of the fleet between the two sides has not only not narrowed, but also widened. If you are optimistic, it will be as early as the end of 2056 that the Chinese Navy will catch up with the United States in terms of fleet size.

Of course, these assessments do not take into account combat consumption.

If the combat consumption is included and the Chinese Navy continues to maintain its previous record, it will be possible to be on par with the US Navy in 2055.

The question is, who can guarantee that the Chinese Navy will never win?

You know, even if Mu Haoyang returns to the fleet, he can only command one fleet to fight. As the fleet expands, the Chinese Navy will definitely have more than one fleet.

It can be said that when making the worst plan, the Chinese Navy must find another way and open up new areas of competition.

There is no doubt that it must be a competitive area that is favorable to China.

At that time, there was a choice in front of Mu Haoyang, that is, to improve the status of escort warships in future naval battles and make full use of the value of escort warships.

In order to understand the value of the escort warship, Mu Haoyang secretly organized an exercise at the end of December.

According to the information disclosed after the war, the main purpose of this exercise is to verify the interception ability of the new terminal intercept system to anti-ship missiles, anti-ship guided bombs and large-caliber electromagnetic cannon shells. The exercise results prove that the electromagnetic rapid-fire gun with a caliber of 70 mm can effectively intercept all types of anti-ship missiles and 1,000 kg class anti-ship guided bombs. After appropriate improvement, it can also intercept 2,000 kg class anti-ship guided bombs, but the efficiency is not high. To deal with 2,000 kg class anti-ship guided bombs, the caliber of the electromagnetic rapid-fire gun must be increased to 100 mm. The exercise also proved a result. The 70 mm electromagnetic rapid-fire gun has no interception ability for large-caliber electromagnetic cannon shells. Even if the caliber is increased to 100 mm, it can only cope with low-density shells, and it cannot play a role in high-intensity shelling.

The results of this exercise are very important because they indirectly affected the Chinese Navy's shipbuilding plan.

One week after the exercise, on January 4, 2053, Mu Haoyang signed the second ministerial order, approved the construction contract for the other eight large-scale integrated warships of the Heilongjiang class, and required major shipyards to submit a draft idea for the new large-scale integrated warship within three months, striving to finalize the construction plan in the second half of 2053 and complete and put into service before the end of 2054.

Subsequently, the Chinese Navy adjusted the aircraft carrier battle group.

After the second batch of eight large comprehensive warships of Heilongjiang class were put into service, the number of large comprehensive warships in each aircraft carrier battle group increased to four, instead of the initial two, nor were the three originally planned. More importantly, of these four large comprehensive warships, two were air defense and two were used for strike.

At the same time, the development of a new generation of large-caliber electromagnetic guns and long-range electromagnetic gun shells were also carried out.

As a result, by the end of March 2053, the Chinese Navy received the first batch of long-range electromagnetic cannon shells with a range of up to 1,200 kilometers.

Relatively speaking, it is much easier to build large comprehensive warships than to build super aircraft carriers.

At that time, eight shipyards in China were able to build large-scale comprehensive warships, with a total number of more than 30 ships and stations, and the construction cycle was only one and a half years.

That's true, the basic tactics of the Chinese Navy must be adjusted.

Chapter 79: Find a different path

Chapter 79: Find a different path
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