.Chapter 68 South China Sea Strategy

When he returned to the General Staff, Mu Haoyang learned that before leaving office, Fu Xiubo had formulated a strategic plan with Wen Tinggui, then Prime Minister, and several other leaders.

In this plan, the core area is not South Asia, but the Taiwan Strait.

According to Fu Xiubo's judgment, China has a very critical node on its development path, namely national reunification.

Before this, China was not a global power, at most it was the region's number one power and a global power with basic influence. Only after the country was unified can it have the ability, qualifications, and strength to expand externally, and the opportunity to challenge the United States on a global scale.

According to this judgment, China must focus its strategic focus on the Taiwan Strait region.

This is also the main starting point of China's basic national policies after the East China Sea War.

By the outbreak of the First South Asian War, the situation in the Taiwan Strait had greatly eased. The Taiwanese authorities not only became more rational in the issue of arms, but also actively sent a signal of reconciliation. With the efforts of both sides, Li Pingko held his first informal meeting with the Taiwanese leaders at the Asia-Pacific Economic Forum in 2024, and was then invited to visit the Horticultural Expo in Taipei. Although Li Pingko refused the invitation from the Taiwanese leader due to political reasons, this matter basically laid the basic style of Taiwan Strait relations.

In the eyes of many people, the two sides of the Taiwan Strait will achieve peaceful reunification within ten to twenty years.

In 2025, in the polls on the island, more than half of the respondents believed that the Taiwanese authorities should actively improve relations with the mainland, and after reaching an agreement on principled issues, they should actively propose a peaceful reunification plan to end the separatist situation that lasted more than half a century.

Of course, this does not mean that the time for peaceful reunification is ripe.

The most important thing here is the "principle issue".

At that time, the Taiwanese leaders had proposed that peaceful reunification must have a prerequisite, that is, the ruling parties on both sides of the Taiwan Strait have equal political status and the ruling power will be decided by the election of the whole people.

This problem has become a gap between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait.

During his meeting with the Taiwanese leader, Li Pingko rejected this request and proposed that Taiwan's political situation was not stable and the governance situation during the unified negotiations could not be determined. Therefore, it was impossible to make arrangements in advance. The mainland still adhered to the basic principle that had been proposed long ago, namely, giving Taiwan all autonomy except diplomacy, and even allowing a certain scale of armed forces to be maintained for a period of time.

Unfortunately, the Taiwanese leaders do not appreciate it and still insist on taking the national election as the premise of unification.

Although after this, under the intervention of Yi Yuan and North Korea, the situation in the Taiwan Strait took some turning points. For example, Yi Yuan and North Korea agreed to carry out universal suffrage on the basis of unification, and the Taiwanese leader also responded that Taiwan would give up part of its right to self-determination, there was still huge differences between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait on the issue of whether to reunify first or universal suffrage first.

Obviously, peaceful reunification is still a very distant thing.

Even though the situation in the Taiwan Strait has improved greatly, based on the actual interests, the mainland has no reason to relax its vigilance, and no reason to give up other solutions.

In this way, the South China Sea issue has become a new key point.

After the East China Sea War, the possibility of Japan interfering in the Taiwan Strait was greatly reduced. During the Sino-Japanese Armistice Agreement, Japan promised not to interfere in Taiwan and the matter was confirmed in black and white. If Japan violated its promise, it would be equivalent to undermining the armistice agreement, and China would launch a military strike against Japan based on this. Without guaranteed local security, Japan has no reason to go to war with China for Taiwan.

In addition, the United States' influence in Taiwan has also been greatly reduced.

After withdrawing troops from Japan, the closest US military base to Taiwan was in the Philippines, while the military base directly controlled by the United States was in Guam. As the ability of US affairs to intervene, its influence on the Taiwan Strait also decreased, and it is difficult to prevent the mainland from using force to achieve unification.

It can be said that the initiative in the Taiwan Strait issue has been taken into consideration by the mainland.

The problem is that if you are forced to achieve unification through force, you must first eliminate the flanking threat. The East China Sea War has solved the threat in one direction, while in the other direction, security guarantees are still not reliable, and the South China Sea dispute is likely to have an impact on the situation in the Taiwan Strait.

According to Fu Xiubo's judgment, as long as the South China Sea dispute is resolved, peaceful reunification will no longer be out of reach.

To put it bluntly, as long as you control the South China Sea region, it is equivalent to surrounding Taiwan from the north and south. The Chinese Navy has sufficient ability to prevent foreign forces from interfering in the war in the Taiwan Strait. The Taiwanese authorities will lose the second option and can only embark on the road of peaceful reunification under the leadership of the mainland.

In fact, it was Fu Xiubo's strategic deployment that determined China's military power construction.

Take the Navy as an example. The construction of the "Yangtze River" class aircraft carrier is mainly to solve the South China Sea problem, rather than to confront the United States within a wider range. The reason is very simple. The "Yangtze River" class is a medium-sized aircraft carrier with limited continuous combat capabilities. It focuses more on sea-making operations rather than an ideal ground strike platform. It is more suitable for activities in areas closer to the local area and to be used as a current strike platform.

In the Air Force, the smooth implementation of the J-20D project is also mainly to deal with the South China Sea dispute. To put it bluntly, the H-X bomber is of little significance to combat in areas around the South China Sea. Heavy fighter bombers such as J-20D with a combat radius of about 2,500 kilometers are more valuable. In addition, the Air Force attaches great importance to multi-purpose fighters and replaces J-10, F and other fighters with J-22, which is also related to the South China Sea dispute.

The adjustment of ground troops has become more obvious. The establishment of a Marine Corps directly commanded by the General Staff to replace the Army's amphibious combat forces is to enhance the offensive capabilities across the sea, especially in large-scale wars, and the ability to control local battlefields, especially island battlefields. If facing the Taiwan Strait, the amphibious forces should be strengthened to improve the combat efficiency of the Army, rather than establishing a highly ** Marine Corps.

After understanding these, Mu Haoyang had to admit that during the years he worked in the General Staff, he was basically moving forward according to Fu Xiubo's plan, and the naval equipment development projects led by him were all subject to restrictions without exception, and only projects that meet the strategic development direction were supported.

Not to mention anything else, Mu Haoyang's proposal was repeatedly rejected by Huang Zhibo on the C2 project.

Although before he left the General Staff, Huang Zhibo approved the C2 project, the first offensive large nuclear-powered aircraft carrier with ground strikes as the main task, it was mainly influenced by Teng Yaohui and did not have much conflict with the strategic plan formulated by Fu Xiubo.

The reason is very simple. The two aircraft carriers are enough to resolve the South China Sea dispute, and the C2 aircraft carrier will face a broader battlefield.

After understanding this issue, Mu Haoyang had to admit that the India-Pakistan conflict was definitely an accident, and even Fu Xiubo did not predict it in time.

Although Huang Zhibo made a prediction as early as 2022 that the situation in India and Pakistan would deteriorate rapidly, and Fu Xiubo also made corresponding arrangements at that time, and even the arms construction was affected, judging from the development in the following five years, China's arms construction focus was still on dealing with the South China Sea dispute, and did not consider fighting with India too much, or did not regard intervening in the India-Pakistan conflict as its main task.

It can even be said that until early 2027, no one expected that Japan and India would provoke a war.

Not to mention, when Mu Haoyang was promoted at the beginning of the year, no one thought that the situation in South Asia would deteriorate rapidly. Even the most pessimistic predictions believed that India would break the deadlock only after 2030, because it would not be until 2030 that India could fully digest and master the new equipment obtained from the United States, complete the structural adjustment of military power, and obtain the military power to quickly defeat Pakistan.

An unexpected war not only did not have a negative impact on Fu Xiubo's strategic planning, but instead made Southeast Asia more important.

The strategic situation is very obvious. The US blockade strategy has gone bankrupt, so it will definitely shift the focus.

From the perspective of containing China, the ideal choice for the United States is to grasp several strategic points, which will force China to spend more resources to defend the lifeline at the sea.

Among them, the Strait of Malacca is crucial.

Therefore, the United States will spare no effort to control Southeast Asia, making China's expansion in the Indian Ocean meaningless, and forcing China to control Southeast Asia first.

If several wars break out here, China's national strength will inevitably be greatly weakened.

More importantly, when China has to focus on Southeast Asia, it will be unable to challenge the United States in other regions, especially the more important Middle East.

The United States will have a chance to breathe, and will have enough time to rebuild a strategic encirclement against China.

Perhaps, the United States will take this opportunity to kill several pro-China countries, such as sending troops to Iran, so that China will lose its bridgehead to enter the Middle East.

So, how to deal with it?

When considering this issue, Mu Haoyang noticed that in Fu Xiubo's central government, Wen Tinggui was not an opponent, but a supporter of Fu Xiubo.

Although Wen Tinggui had different opinions on some policies and always believed that a relatively moderate foreign policy should be adopted, in all major decisions, Wen Tinggui was a staunch supporter of Fu Xiubo, and as the prime minister, he solved many problems for Fu Xiubo.

Take this strategic plan as an example, Wen Tinggui's influence can be seen everywhere.

Fu Xiubo's propositions are more reflected in politics, diplomacy and military affairs. Wen Tinggui gave the finishing touch, that is, any strategic policy must serve the construction of the country and the national economy. Only when the economy is developed can a solid foundation be laid for the country's strength.

From an economic perspective, whether in Southeast Asia or South Asia, China's strategy is serving development.

This is an unavoidable question, because if China wants to surpass the United States, it must first win in economic development, otherwise any expansionary policy will end in failure.

More importantly, only by focusing on economic development can we receive wider support in China.

Any policy, if it cannot receive internal support, will inevitably fail.

This understanding allowed Mu Haoyang to see further...

:
Chapter completed!