The four attacks on the joint fleet were the four aircraft led by Colonel Yan Yingbo

In order to enhance the suddenness of the attack, the Chinese Air Force also dispatched six squadrons of air-controlling fighter jets.

Tactically speaking, this does not make sense. J11 and J10 have no stealth ability and cannot approach the target quietly. Yang Yu's arrangement is to make J11 and J10 attract the enemy's attention, so that the enemy will ignore the biggest threat. In terms of tactical arrangement, the four J20s did not act alone, but met with the j11 and j10 aircraft groups, and each had a squadron fighter at the front of the formation.

As a result, e3g detected the j11 and j10 squadrons, but did not find j20 inside.

This is also understandable that compared with j11 and j10, the radar reflected signals of j20 are completely negligible. As long as the distance is close enough, j11 and j10 are enough to block j20.

In addition, the Air Force also dispatched a strategic electronic reconnaissance aircraft.

At that time, Yang Yufang wanted to arrange early warning aircraft, but the Air Force made a better suggestion, that is, to use strategic electronic reconnaissance aircraft to provide battlefield information to the aircraft fleet.

If an early warning aircraft is dispatched, under the influence of the sunspot explosion, at least it must go forward to the East China Sea Fleet to detect the fighter jets of the Japanese Air Self-Defense Force. In this place, it will definitely be discovered by e3g. Even if the impact of the sunspot explosion on the electronic equipment on the early warning aircraft is not considered, because the remote detection capability is weakened, the distance of kj2000 to discover f22a will not exceed 100 kilometers, and f22a can lock kj2000 from 100 kilometers away. Letting the early warning aircraft exit in front is equivalent to letting the early warning aircraft die.

Because there are only four kj2000s, the Chinese Air Force's worst loss is the early warning aircraft.

Relatively speaking, strategic electronic reconnaissance aircraft do not need to go forward, they can move over the second fleet and detect electromagnetic signals sent by enemy aircraft in a passive manner.

As long as there is no active detection, e3g will not detect strategic electronic reconnaissance aircraft hundreds of kilometers away.

It must be admitted that the Japanese Air Self-Defense Force adopted the most appropriate air defense interception tactics.

Before launching the Aim120d, the twelve F22a did not start the fire control radar, but used the tactical information provided by the early warning aircraft to input rough information for the missile in advance. After the missile approached the target, the fire control radar was activated to lock the target for the missile.

Doing so will inevitably reduce the missile's hit rate and make the F22a fleet unable to maneuver.

However, judging from the situation at that time, the main purpose of F22a's long-range interception was not to shoot down enemy aircraft, but to strive for a favorable situation before entering combat air battles.

The biggest benefit of this tactic is that the f22a will not expose its whereabouts until the missile approaches the target.

Only when a suddenness is achieved can the attack be effective.

The problem is that in order to obtain necessary target information, e3g must adjust the working mode of the radar and perform high-frequency scanning of the incoming aircraft cluster.

To put it simply, e3g does what should have been done by f22a.

As long as the early warning aircraft changes the radar scanning method, the radar warning system on the fighter will issue an alarm, and the strategic electronic reconnaissance aircraft behind the fighter will also issue an alarm.

That's why, when the Aim120d was about to arrive, six squadrons of fighters turned collectively to evacuate.

Zhou Yusheng's submarine will not arrive in four hours, so there is no need to fight the Japanese Air Self-Defense Forces at this time.

In fact, at this time, after retaining the necessary air defense force, there are not many fighter jets that the Chinese Air Force and HNA can deploy.

In order to organize this feint attack, the Chinese Air Force even withdrew all air defense fighters except J20.

If it is not during the daytime when sunspots are affected significantly, but at night, the Chinese Air Force can use up to thirty-six fighter jets to conduct feint attacks.

After the crew of aircraft responsible for the feint attack retreated, the four J20s did not retreat.

The reason is very simple. After the aircraft group turned, twelve F22a activated the fire control radar and locked the attack target for the aim120d in advance.

In this way, the twelve f22a have exposed their whereabouts.

When choosing assault routes, strategic electronic reconnaissance aircraft played a crucial role, that is, to formulate the most reliable routes for the four J20s.

Instead of attacking f22a, it penetrates the "eagle wall" composed of f22a and attacks the joint fleet in the east.

f22a stared at j11 and j10, but did not find j20 at all. After completing the guidance work, f22a turned and left the battlefield.

j20 broke through the defense line of the Air Self-Defense Force without much effort.

After launching electromagnetic rockets in turn, the four J20s turned to retreat.

Because the electromagnetic rocket caused interference to e3g, before the detection ability of e3g returned to normal, j20 had already flew out dozens of kilometers and left the detection area of ​​e3g.

After receiving the news, Kojiro Kimura first thought that the squadron used ballistic missiles.

The ability to launch a strike without warning is only a ballistic missile, and it is the most advanced ballistic missile just obtained by the Chinese Second Artillery Force.

According to the intelligence provided by CIA, China has developed tactical ballistic missiles with stealth penetration capabilities.

If this is true, only this kind of missile can launch a sudden attack.

There is a reason to choose to launch an attack during the day. The most important thing is that under sunspots, the missile early warning satellites in orbit cannot work properly, so it is impossible to determine whether the squadron uses ballistic missiles, and it is even more impossible to issue an alarm.

However, Kojiro Kimura's judgment was quickly rejected.

Before the attack, the four air defense destroyers in the joint fleet were operating normally and did not detect incoming missiles, and the e3g did not find any ballistic missiles reentered into the atmosphere.

No matter how stealthy the ballistic missile has, it is impossible to launch a sudden attack under the nose of the early warning aircraft.

Not a ballistic missile, is that a submarine?

This judgment was quickly rejected.

Although intelligence proves that Chinese submarines have obtained available electromagnetic weapons, Chinese submarines have not used electromagnetic weapons in this war.

More importantly, the detonation height of the electromagnetic warhead exceeds 10,000 meters, and the detonation height of the submarine using electromagnetic weapons is definitely not so high. As long as the submarine approaches the fleet, it is enough to detonate the electromagnetic warhead at a height of several hundred meters. There is no need to risk being intercepted by the air defense system and launch the electromagnetic warhead to a height of 10,000 meters and then detonate. In addition, except for strategic nuclear submarines, other submarines do not have the appropriate means to launch the electromagnetic probe to a height of 10,000 meters.

Obviously, the fighter jets of the Chinese Air Force attacked the joint fleet.

Even if Kojiro Kimura is not a general of the Air Self-Defense Force, he can still think that the person who attacked the Joint Fleet is likely to be a j20 with excellent stealth ability.

However, before that, j20 had never participated in an offensive operation.

Answer: Why didn’t the Chinese Air Force allow J20 to participate in the offensive operation, but instead allowed J11 and J10 to bear greater combat losses. No matter how cheap J11 and J10 are, they should avoid combat losses within their ability.

Tactically speaking, the greatest value of stealth aircraft exists is not for defense, but for offense.

After the stealth aircraft appeared on the battlefield, the first thing they undertake was offensive tasks. After more than 20 years of service in the F117a, the F22a used for air control was put into service. The US Air Force spared no effort to improve the F22a and even developed the FB22 in order to tap the offensive potential of this fighter.

For the Air Force, the most effective defense method is attack.

Du Hei made it very clear in "Theory of Air Control" that the best air defense method is to blow up the enemy's combat aircraft on the airport.

After receiving the information provided by CIA, the Japanese Air Self-Defense Force found out that J20 has not yet formed complete combat effectiveness.

The Chinese Air Force invested huge sums of money to develop J20, which was comparable to F22a, and was used to compete for air supremacy. The main purpose was to enhance the air force's strike capabilities. However, China's technical reserves are far inferior to the United States, and encountered many difficulties in developing J20. For example, the bottleneck caused by the engine forced the Chinese Air Force to compromise on the aerodynamic appearance of the fighter, thus limiting the omnidirectional stealth capability of the J20 and only focusing on the stealth capability of the front half of the ball. The limitations on the aerodynamic appearance have an impact on the fuselage structure, making it difficult for the J20 to apply large-scale ground strike ammunition, thus limiting its ground strike capabilities.

In general, the j20 is not a mature fighter, and it will have to wait at least a few years before it can compete with the f22a.

Affected by this, even Imai Tatsumura believed that the Chinese Air Force could not use such immature fighter jets to carry out high-risk offensive missions.

This was true in previous battles. The Chinese Air Force would rather lose more j11 and j10 than allow j20 to participate in the offensive operation.

Obviously, the Japanese Air Self-Defense Force seriously underestimated the combat effectiveness of J20.

This type of fighter is indeed not mature enough to carry anti-ship missiles with internal bomb bays to perform sea strike missions, but its excellent stealth performance, especially the stealth ability of the front hemisphere, is enough to play an important role in sea strike operations, such as using electromagnetic weapons to deal with the Japanese fleet.

If it weren't for the shortage of numbers and a large portion of the cover early warning aircraft needed to be set aside, the performance of j20 in this war would definitely be even more eye-catching.

This assault fully proves j20's strike ability.

Of course, Kojiro Kimura could not think of this. The first thing he had to do at that time was to let the joint fleet return to Naha as soon as possible, rather than waiting for death on the sea less than a hundred kilometers away from Naha.

After receiving the news, Kojiro Kimura immediately ordered the anti-submarine patrol aircraft to cover the joint fleet.

Subsequently, the Intelligence Headquarters sent news that the bomber group that attacked the third guard group returned to the air base, and it was the air base that was departing and did not fly to the southern part of Zhejiang.

Now, the first thing to consider is the threat posed by submarines, rather than the bombers of the Chinese Air Force.

After repeatedly ordering anti-submarine patrol aircraft to strengthen their vigilance, Kojiro Kimura sent anti-submarine helicopters, but these helicopters did not carry anti-submarine torpedoes, but electronic chips used to repair the warship's power control system. No matter how solid the anti-submarine barrier is, it is impossible to ensure that there is no foolproof. Only by allowing the warship to recover its power as soon as possible and return to Naha can we avoid being attacked by submarines, and will undoubtedly die if we stay on the sea.

However, it is almost impossible to quickly repair twenty-two large warships.

No matter how high the quality of the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force officers and soldiers is, it will take several hours.

For submarines, it only takes dozens of minutes to end a fleet.
Chapter completed!