Considering the cost of war has always been the top priority in Zhao Bing's mind, and it has been with him for many years. It can be said that in addition to political and military considerations, every battle must be considered, whether it will lose money in one battle, how much profit is obtained, and whether you can bear it.

At first, Zhao Bing was still relatively anxious. At that time, it was just to survive, and everything was to survive as the highest interest. The cost of war did not need to be too much, but to be able to be alive tomorrow. Later, when he gained a firm foothold in Qiongzhou, he needed to consider the cost because he had to consider political needs, but the pressure was relatively small at that time. After all, they were on a strategic defensive and relied on their local warfare.

But after entering Jiangnan, it was no longer possible. First, the army expanded significantly, and military expenditures did not increase exponentially, but increased geometrically. Furthermore, every war often used tens of thousands of troops, which consumed a huge amount. When he launched a war, he had to consider the country's ability to withstand it, and he had to make a comprehensive measure of the intensity and duration of the war, and even compromised for it politically.

However, the nomadic peoples’ consideration for war is very simple. For them, war is a business without any capital, and basically there is a profit and no loss. If you ask how Zhao Bing knows it, it is what he knew in his previous life and what he understood in this life.

First of all, how powerful did the nomadic peoples in the glorious period have? In the heyday of the early Han Dynasty, the Xiongnu were known as "more than 300,000 people who controlled strings". During the Battle of Baidengshan, the Han people estimated that the Xiongnu mobilized 300,000 cavalry. In the early Xianbei period, "a hundred thousand soldiers" and "more than 100,000 cavalry" in the Tanshihuai era were enough to cause trouble for China.

The Tuoba Xianbei rose when he was weak, and had "more than 200,000 horses on the string control horse", and later generations gradually developed to "more than 400,000 knights on the string control". Of course, these data can only show the full potential of the nomadic peoples, not the actual use of troops, because in war, the leaders of nomadic peoples usually only have tens of thousands of cavalry around them.

During the battle between the Tuoba Xianbei and the Later Yan, the main force was only 20,000 cavalry; during the Genghis Khan era, the total force of Mongolia was only more than 100,000 cavalry. How much is the cost of such a military force? It can be said to be extremely cheap. The unique production and lifestyle of the nomadic peoples determined that the chiefs had almost no need to worry about anything, let alone pay for it themselves.

Zhao Bing once obtained a note from Westerners in early Mongolia, which once described the lifestyle of the Mongolians when they first started. The Mongolians almost did not rely on food to survive. They rely on hunting wild animals or slaughtering livestock they had herded for food. They were quite frugal and not picky about food.

When these Westerners came to the prairie, some of their entourages were hungry by the Mongols. It is said that the Mongols were so "save" that they only slaughtered a pig. After eating their own rations, they were told that it was the weight of thirteen meals! The Mongols themselves could survive a day by drinking a small cup of tare porridge in the morning, and they could sing happily for two days when they hunger.

In the war, they eat even more easily. If they are hungry, they can make a decision on their horses. After running desperately, the horse's hooves will be extremely congested. The Mongolians bleed on the horse's hooves and suck a little blood to satisfy their hunger. If there is a mare in the horse's herd, he can also use horse milk to improve his life.

Therefore, in the war, each of the Mongols carried multiple war horses, which could not only multiply to preserve the horse's physical strength, but also gain more food reserves. In this way, they could fight for about ten days. Of course, there were Western prejudices and one-sided feelings, which was acceptable for Zhao Bing to make a half-fold, and the cost was also very low.

Let’s look at the respective combat effectiveness of cavalry and infantry. The battlefields for the competition between nomadic peoples and farming peoples are usually in the Mongolian grasslands or the North China Plain, which is an extremely beneficial combat area for nomadic cavalry.

The Tang people's "Anti-Classic" briefly believed that "the plains are wide and the wilderness, and the place where the chariots and cavalry are not worth one in ten infantry." The Six Strategies calculate it more clearly, believing that in the battle of plains and wilderness, one cavalry can still stand up to four infantry, and even on dangerous terrain, one cavalry can still stand up to four infantry.

Of course, Zhao Bing also knew that this was just an empirical data, which showed an ideal battle. In more practical battle examples, the cavalry would never wait foolishly for all the slow infantry to concentrate before launching an attack on them. They often seized the initiative and defeated the scattered infantry units. Therefore, a nomadic cavalry that hardly had to worry about logistics support had high mobility that was incomparable to infantry.

Strategically, they can appear anywhere as long as they are happy; even from a purely tactical point of view, they can usually maintain two to three times the advantage of sustainable battlefield maneuver over infantry. Cavalry has two or three times the frequency of attacks over infantry and the priority of choosing battlefield and attack direction.

Facing a loose infantry array, the cavalry may easily win with one or two charges; even if the infantry array is very tightly defended, an experienced chief can give up the frontal impact and instead use his maneuvering advantages to fully utilize his maneuvering advantages, either breaking them one by one, or seducing the enemy, or chasing them with one by one, or pursuing them with one by one, or pursuing them with one by one, or pursuing them with one by one, and pursuing them with one by one, and pursuing them with one by one, and pursuing them with one by one, and pursuing them with one by one, and pursuing them with one by one, and pursuing them with one by one, and pursuing them with one by one, and detours them with one by one. They will cut off their logistical supplies, and wait patiently for the enemy to be dragged down by hunger and panic, and successfully defeating opponents that are far beyond their own.

If a nomadic leader brought 100,000 cavalry to cross the pass of Yinshan or Yanshan from the Mongolian Plateau, or break through the Yuguan in the western Liaoning Corridor and enter the North China Plain - for them, this was just an easy trip. He could use his own mobility advantages to bring the spoils to the grassland calmly before the army of the Central Plains dynasty arrived.

If he is willing to show off his courage or greed for more spoils, he can find a suitable place to fight the army of the Central Plains dynasty - this place is likely to be a pass that must be broken through. Therefore, on the vast plains in northern China, nomadic cavalry has such a strong advantage, and the pressure the farming nations have to face can be imagined.

Therefore, nomadic people can decide whether to fight this battle or not, and where to fight. Even if they suffer in a wrong judgment, they will not suffer disastrous consequences, and they can easily escape. The Central Plains Emperor, without exception, deliberately operated the valleys and rivers connecting the Mongolian Plateau and the North China Plain as the most important national defense line of the empire. Once this line of defense is broken, the nightmare of the Central Plains dynasty will come.

But what did the leader of the nomadic people pay in this war with great victories? He can say that the war paid nearly zero costs. His benefits were always quite considerable. No matter what the calculation was, it was a huge profit.

On the other hand, in order to resist the nomadic cavalry, for example, 100,000 cavalry, how much does the emperor of the Central Plains dynasty need to pay? In a possible decisive battle, he must prepare the combat power equivalent to hundreds of thousands of infantry soldiers, and he must coincidentally concentrate all these people on the main battlefield in order to expect some win.

In order to support 100,000 Han cavalry or 700,000 infantry or 700,000 to 800,000 infantry, what is the base of the population that the empire needs? Zhao Bing simply calculated the current basic data of this dynasty. In addition to providing his equipment, what is more important is food and grass, that is, a hundred farmers can support a warrior, and the cost during the army's expedition was even more amazing.

The farming state mobilized 100,000 troops, which took one month, which required 300,000 direct logistics support personnel. These 400,000 people would consume 180,000 stones of food in a month's battle. However, among these 400,000 people, only 70,000 troops could be used, which was not enough for the 20,000 nomadic cavalry to eat for a while.

If the war took three months to six months and the 400,000 people who were mobilized would spend 540,000 to one million stones of food. This is just an ideal data. The abnormal losses in the war are usually amazing, because in such a large-scale mobilization, accidents are inevitable. Perhaps in the canal transport, due to the losses of floods or floods or fires, or burning in the warehouse, they may be more likely to be robbed by a hunting nomadic cavalry.

If this war lasted for half a year, the Central Plains dynasty mobilized troops equivalent to 100,000 nomadic cavalry, and was converted into 700,000 infantry. In this six months, regardless of the victory or defeat, the empire's army and logistics personnel would consume more than 7 million stones of food. Of course, this is not only the military force used, but also the food consumed by nearly 3 million soldiers who maintained the logistics. According to the output rate of 1 to 2 in grain and grain, the actual grain output must reach 15 million stones to meet the needs.

A group of people in the Secretary-General also made a cost calculation based on Zhao Bing's idea of ​​Emperor Wu of Han's expedition to the Huns as a model. One stone in the Song Dynasty was about two and a half stone in the Han Dynasty, but the Song Dynasty sent five million stones to nearly 40 million stones in the Han Dynasty. In the Han Dynasty, a family of five had a farming area of ​​only 100 acres and harvested only 100 stones. If the Western Han Dynasty was levied at a standard tax rate of 30 to 100 stones, the average person could provide about seven dou of tax grain.

Based on this, 57 million agricultural population is needed to provide 700,000 infantry or 140,000 cavalry (that is, Wei Qing's troops to go out to the fortress to expedition) for the half-year expedition. However, the highest population record of the Han Dynasty is only 60 million. Moreover, the expeditionary forces of Wei Qing, Huo Qubing, Li Guangli also need flags, armor, swords, bows and arrows, vehicles, combat equipment, rewards, as well as resettlement of prisoners or surrendered tribes... These all require a lot of wealth and food from the empire.
Chapter completed!