In a sense, the Russian authorities dared to act in the mid-day issue and provoke the authority of the Republic because they viewed the strategic nuclear submarines outside the scope of the tactical power of the Republic, which ensured that they always had the minimum strategic deterrence capability to the Republic. Looking back, this is how similar is to the hegemony of Japan's hegemony that ignored the serious consequences of the destruction and destruction of the Republic before the New Year.

It must be admitted that Russia is not Japan, and it is much stronger than Japan.

Suddenly, Russia decided to focus on the deployment of strategic ballistic missile submarines on the pretext of fulfilling its second phase of the London Treaty, and transferred all the strategic submarines originally deployed in the Pacific Fleet to the Northern Fleet, and only retained the strategic submarine forces in the Northern Fleet.

The biggest purpose of this move is to target the strategic threat of the Republic.

Although the Russian Pacific Fleet Submarine Force Base is not in Vladivostok Sea Cucumber, it is located in Biopavlovsk, located on the Half Ukrainian Kamchatka, which is thousands of kilometers away from the Republic and faces directly to the North Pacific Ocean, with no restrictions on the sea route. More importantly, strategic submarines deployed there do not need to enter the North Pacific Ocean, and can completely exceed 10,000 square kilometers in area and have an average water depth of 900 meters. The Okhotsk nautical mileage located between the Kamchatka Peninsula, the Kuril Island, the Kuye Island of Sakhalin and the Russian Far East, thus obtaining the cover of the Russian shore-based anti-submarine forces.

The Sea of ​​Okhotsk is not completely a closed sea area, nor does it belong to Russia, and some of it is international sea area. In other words, the spy ships of the Republic can enter the Sea of ​​Fukhotsk with a swagger. The attack submarines of the Republic are no exception. Even if the Russian shore-based anti-submarine forces pose a huge threat to any country's submarine, no one can guarantee that the attack submarines of the Republic can be found and sunk before their strategic submarines are sunk. In other words, the Russian strategic submarines deployed in the Sea of ​​Okhotsk are not absolutely safe. Of course, the same is true for the Russian strategic submarines that are ahead of the North Pacific.

In fact, as early as the year after the Liyao, the Republic's Navy increased its activity in the Sea of ​​Okhotsk. The Republic's intelligence agencies even dispatched spy ships continuously and drew up the seabed topographic map of the Sea of ​​Okhotsk in just a few years. They gathered current information. These were all preparing for the deployment of attack submarines.

According to the news released by the Russian authorities, around the world around Li Nian, shortly after the large-scale military operation in the Middle East War, the Republic's attack submarine entered the Sea of ​​Okhotsk and had contact with the Russian anti-submarine forces while tracking the Russian strategic submarines.

The most serious accident occurred in the old month of Daohong. When a Republican Navy attack submarine was following the Russian strategic submarine, it was too close to the Russian submarine and had provocative actions, which made the Russian submarine slightly angry. As a result, the two submarines collided approximately under the sea. Fortunately, the two submarines had double-layer shells. Otherwise, the consequences of this underwater collision were unimaginable. This accident caused the Russian authorities to decide to deploy all strategic submarines to the northern fleet.

Of course, being far away from the Republic may not be all good.

From the perspective of active attack, of course, the closer the distance, the better, and strategic strike force is no exception. Take strategic ballistic missiles for example. When the range is kilometer and the range is 0 kilometers, the flight time of the former is only one-third of the latter. That is to say, the interception time left for the opponent is only one-third of the latter. In the same case, the probability of penetration is three times higher than the latter. In order to shorten the flight time of the missile, before and after the signing of the London Treaty, the new generation of strategic ballistic missiles of the Republic, the United States, Russia and other countries have adopted lower flight trajectory by increasing the engine thrust while ensuring the range.

The problem is that the main value of strategic submarines does not have to take the initiative to attack.

Although the active attack strength of strategic submarines cannot be denied, if they can deploy strategic submarines to a sea area hundreds of kilometers away from the central coast of the enemy, they can complete devastating strikes within minutes, making the enemy's strategic defense system useless and not even give the enemy enough counterattack time. However, it is a very difficult and almost impossible task to deploy strategic submarines to the enemy's doorstep. It can be said that among all nuclear powers, the main task of strategic submarines is to report devastatingly on the enemy's homeland when they are subject to nuclear strikes on the local area and other strategic counterattack forces are effective.

In peacetime, strategic submarines are the strongest deterrent force. For a strategic submarine carrying a ballistic missile, each missile carries an otter warhead. If all missiles are fired at one time and the warheads hit, they can destroy all large and medium-sized cities in any country, or all major cities in the world. Even if some warheads are intercepted, they can also be blocked by cluster attack, that is, some warheads are detonated in advance in front, destroying the enemy's defense system, allowing the rest of the warheads to break through smoothly, and can also cause major blows to the enemy, thus forcing the enemy to have some concerns when launching a war.

It is precisely because of such an important deterrence ability that, in the context of the comprehensive destruction of nuclear weapons, the reduction work of the first two stages has been completed, several nuclear powers have not given up on strategic submarines. Instead, they have tried every means to enhance the penetration capability of submarine-launched ballistic missiles, such as equip them with more bait warheads.

Russia is no exception. Its only has a strategic submarine view, "The threat of 60 submarine-launched ballistic missiles cannot be underestimated..."

Of course, deploying strategic submarines to the Northern Fleet. The biggest advantage is that you don’t have to worry about being “harassed” by the Republic’s attack submarines.

As we all know, the Republic has no military bases on the North Atlantic, and no naval bases available for the deployment of attack submarines.

The closest to the Russian Northern Fleet is located in the Southern Atlantic Ocean, which was leased to the Republic by Argentina. Not to mention how many difficulties and obstacles you will encounter from the South Atlantic Ocean, just a long voyage is enough to prevent any attack submarine from stooping north. From the estuary of the La Plata River to the Barents Sea, the straight-line distance is about a fierce kilometers, and the actual range is more than 1,000 kilometers. Under normal circumstances, the underwater cruise speed of the attack submarine is below the junction of the mouth, so one-way navigation requires mountains and sky, and the round trip requires sky, while the general activity cycle of the attack submarine is around Goutian, which means that it can only be active in the Barents Sea for 8 days. If the continuous tracking of two Russian submarines is prevailed, and the Republic's Navy's duty rate is as high as irrigation, an attack submarine must also be deployed in Argentina.

Obviously, this is very unrealistic, because the Republic's Navy only has a lot of attack submarines. This is still purely theoretical calculations, considering that the North Atlantic has always been the territory of the US Navy. There will be more troubles in actual deployment.

Not deploying a submarine does not mean not doing anything else.

Since Liwanennian, the Republic's Navy has cooperated with intelligence agencies such as the Military Intelligence Agency to strengthen comprehensive surveys of the Russian Northern Fleet's frequent activities, especially in the Barents Sea, Kara Sea, Laptev Sea, East Siberian Sea and Chukchi Sea under the control of the Russian Navy. It has even sent attack submarines with advanced performance and special detection instruments to the Arctic Ocean to carry out the mission of crossing the Arctic ice sheet. There is only one purpose of doing these things: to master the hydrological situation of the Arctic Ocean, as well as the seabed topography, determine the activity of the Arctic Ocean ice sheet, and then determine the possible activity areas of the Russian strategic submarine, and to determine the ideal missile launching point at different times.

Although in the eyes of many people, as long as the attack submarines cannot be continuously deployed in the Arctic Ocean, even if they master the activities of Russian strategic submarines, they cannot prevent them from launching submarine-launched ballistic missiles. Therefore, it is meaningless to do these things. But from a different perspective, you can see the great significance of them.

Inability to prevent the Russian strategic submarine from launching submarine-launched ballistic missiles does not mean that it is powerless to do anything about it.

Under the premise of having a strong strategic defense system, even if the ballistic missile takes off, it can prevent the warhead from falling.

The best time for strategic defense is the missile rise stage. Because advanced strategic missiles use fast-burning engines, the rise stage is very short, whether to detect and lock up the rising missile in time becomes the key. To this end, the approximate launch area of ​​the missile must be determined. Only in order to allow reconnaissance satellites to focus on these areas, so that the alarm will be issued immediately after the missile is launched, and the intercepting satellites will intercept immediately. In this way, it is natural to allocate relevant information in peacetime to determine the range of activities of enemy submarines and the main missile launch sites as much as possible.

In fact, strategic submarines will not move at will, and it is even more impossible to launch missiles in any sea area.

Generally speaking, strategic submarines have fixed patrol routes. Of course, this route is not only absolutely confidential, but also adjusted every time. There are many benefits of using fixed routes, such as deploying attack submarines that perform cover missions on the route in advance, and accurately determining the location of the submarines to reduce the trouble of launching missiles. This is true, strategic submarines generally have several fixed missile launch sites. When performing combat readiness patrol missions, strategic submarines generally patrol between several missile launch sites, and stay at each launch site for too long to avoid exposing their whereabouts. In this way, missiles can be launched quickly when receiving the launch order. If they are in other sea areas, they need to float to the water surface to locate the submarine and reinstall the launch information for the missile, which extends the launch preparation time and reduces the survival probability of the submarine.

Mu Yong doubted that there will not be too many suitable missile launch sites in the Arctic Ocean, especially in winter. Although Russia's strategic submarines have ice-breaking capabilities, and when necessary, they can use the heat released by the reactor to dissolve thicker ice. Therefore, they have very strong activity capabilities. However, it will definitely take time to break ice. Solving the ice with high temperature and hot water will expose their whereabouts. Therefore, under normal circumstances, Russian strategic submarines will move in unicated seas and choose to standby in unicated launch sites.

At the end of the month of the mouth, it is the severe winter in the northern hemisphere.

Because the climate is particularly cold this year and the Arctic ice sheets are heading south early, the sea areas suitable for strategic submarine activities on the Barents Sea are not vast.

When the reconnaissance satellite system had measured the exact location of most Russian missile launchers and the long-range strategic alert radar also detected the Russian strategic bomber, the Republic's Sky Army was adjusting the military satellites over the Barents Sea and activated several backup interceptor satellites. Preparations were made to intercept submarine-launched ballistic missiles.

In fact, this didn't take much time. It was only ten minutes.

Beijing time, after everything is ready, the central computer of the national strategic defense system sends attack signals to the kinetic energy intercepting satellite located in low-Earth orbit.

In less than a blade second, % of the interceptor satellites equipped with kinetic energy warheads completed the attack operation.

Like the previous attack, this round of attacks is still silent at the beginning. It is just that the earth will definitely shake at the end.

The so-called kinetic energy interceptor satellite is a military satellite that uses kinetic energy weapons to fight.

Of course, the so-called kinetic energy weapon is actually a high-density heat-resistant alloy rod that is driven and accelerated by a small rocket and equipped with a high-density heat-resistant alloy rod that controls the rocket engine. According to the difference between the targets of the attack, the mass of this metal rod is between hundreds of grams and dozens of kilograms. Of course, its power is determined by its mass. For example, when intercepting space targets, a metal rod of hundreds of grams can completely destroy a nuclear warhead or a launch vehicle. If you need to deal with targets in the atmosphere, such as an airplane, you need to use a

A metal rod of several kilograms has to be used when dealing with a target on the ground. Although it is not filled with high-energy explosives, its destructive power cannot be underestimated with the speed of thousands of kilometers per second. For example, when a metal rod of kilograms falls to the ground at a speed of meter per second, the kinetic energy is as high as a megacity, which is equivalent to the energy released by the explosives when it explodes. In other words, such a metal rod falls on the ground and is enough to destroy all artificial facilities within a radius of 100 meters.

It is precisely this that many people believe that kinetic energy intercepting weapons are offensive weapons, not defensive weapons.

In fact, when energy weapons were popular, the Republic and the United States did not abandon kinetic energy weapons. Instead, they spent huge amounts of money to develop new kinetic energy weapons and deploy kinetic energy intercepting satellites in low-Earth orbit, in order to make such weapons that are more suitable for offensive use. It is naturally the most appropriate way to use kinetic energy weapons to deal with Russian missile launchers.

For kinetic energy weapons with a flight speed of thousands of kilometers per second, from a low-Earth orbit that reaches hundreds of kilometers high to the ground, it only takes a hundred seconds.

Compared with other weapons, the advantages of kinetic energy weapons are very obvious.

Not to mention, kinetic energy weapons are difficult to intercept, and even more difficult to intercept by energy weapons. Even if they are intercepted, they will have a certain threat to ground targets.

More importantly, the attack of kinetic energy weapons came very suddenly.

For the Russian officers and soldiers on the missile launcher, when they felt the abnormality, the kinetic energy weapon had fallen to the ground and a violent explosion occurred. Even if some Russian officers and soldiers looked up at the starry sky while the vehicle was driving, they could only see some light left by a meteor when it was cutting through the night sky, and then the explosion was like a shaking explosion, as well as the shock waves and sounds generated by the explosion.

If you look down from a satellite hundreds of kilometers high, or from an orbital space station, you can only see dazzling fireballs suddenly appearing on the dark Russian land. In any case, it is equivalent to a violent explosion of more than 2 tons, and it will never be too calm.

Because kinetic energy weapons are difficult to detect, the Russian senior officials did not know until they lost contact with the troops and received reports from neighboring troops. Their strategic strike forces were hit by a devastating blow.

At this time, it is unlikely to recover the losses.

It can even be said that it is unlikely to reduce losses.

The chess strike came very suddenly and violently. For the top Russian leaders, or to Russian President Chiliakov, there are only two choices: one is to bear the blow silently, and the other is to use the remaining power to carry out strategic counterattacks.

Anyway, Chelyakov is Russian, and if he chooses to condemn him, he is not Russian.

Moscow time was extremely old, which means less than an old minute after being hit, Kiliakov issued a strategic counterattack order.

At this time, the always cautious Russian president overlooked a very critical issue.

That is, why did the Russian military's strategic communication system not be hit?

Although ultra-long-wave and very long-wave radio stations are built on the state grid, that is, using the power grid as a transmitting antenna. Without a separate antenna, no country can completely destroy Russia's state grid at once, and it is impossible for the world to blow up the transmitting antenna of the strategic radio station. However, the strategic communication system also has a control system, so as long as the control system is destroyed, the strategic communication system can be paralyzed.

In other words, if the Republic really launches a strategic strike against Russia. In order to avoid retaliation, it will definitely have to try to paralyze the Russian military's strategic communication system, so that the Russian president cannot issue a counterattack order to the submarine lurking in the sea. It will make Russia unable to carry out a strategic counterattack.

If Chelyakov calmed down, he would definitely be able to see the problem.

To put it simply, the Republic is going to take this opportunity to let Russia's strategic submarines surface and destroy the last strategic force of the Russian army.

In fact, after issuing a strategic counterattack order, Kiliakov realized this.

The problem is that the order has been issued, and it is too late to stop it. You must know that the strategic counterattack order is the highest level of order that the president can issue, and its value is to be done with the enemy. Therefore, the priority level of the strategic counterattack order is the highest and cannot be changed.
Chapter completed!